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Abstract
Over the years, the Web has shrunk the world, allowing in-
dividuals to share viewpoints with many more people than
they are able to in real life. At the same time, however, it has
also enabled anti-social and toxic behavior to occur at an un-
precedented scale. Video sharing platforms like YouTube re-
ceive uploads from millions of users, covering a wide vari-
ety of topics and allowing others to comment and interact in
response. Unfortunately, these communities are periodically
plagued with aggression and hate attacks. In particular, recent
work has showed how these attacks often take place as a result
of “raids,” i.e., organized efforts coordinated by ad-hoc mobs
from third-party communities.
Despite the increasing relevance of this phenomenon, on-
line services often lack effective countermeasures to mitigate
it. Unlike well-studied problems like spam and phishing, coor-
dinated aggressive behavior both targets and is perpetrated by
humans, making defense mechanisms that look for automated
activity unsuitable. Therefore, the de-facto solution is to reac-
tively rely on user reports and human reviews. In this paper, we
propose an automated solution to identify videos that are likely
to be targeted by coordinated harassers. First, we characterize
and model YouTube videos along several axes (metadata, au-
dio transcripts, thumbnails) based on a ground truth dataset of
raid victims. Then, we use an ensemble of classifiers to deter-
mine the likelihood that a video will be raided with high ac-
curacy (AUC up to 94%). Overall, our work paves the way for
providing video platforms like YouTube with proactive sys-
tems to detect and mitigate coordinated hate attacks.
1 Introduction
As social interactions increasingly take place on the Web,
cyber-aggression has unfortunately become a pressing prob-
lem [28, 57]. In particular, coordinated harassment campaigns
are more and more frequent, with perpetrators working to-
gether to deliver harmful content in a repetitive fashion [11,
12, 19]. One example of such behavior is a phenomenon
known as raiding, i.e., ad-hoc mobs coordinating on social
platforms to organize and orchestrate attacks aimed to dis-
rupt other platforms and undermine users who advocate
for issues and policies they do not agree with [30, 37].
Nonetheless, service providers are often criticized for pro-
viding inadequate countermeasures [62, 63]. Abusive activity
is generated by humans and not by automated programs, thus,
systems used to detect unwanted content, bots, etc. [6, 5, 10,
45, 59, 60, 66] are not easily adapted to this problem. Hence,
platforms mostly adopt reactive solutions, letting users report
abusive accounts and taking actions according to terms of ser-
vices, e.g., blocking or suspending offenders [35]. However,
this approach is inherently slow, and limited by biases in the
reports and by the resources available to verify them. More-
over, this inevitably yields an arms race with the abusers, who
can create new accounts when they get blocked.
In this paper, we focus on raids against YouTube videos.
We do so since: (1) YouTube is one of the top visited sites
worldwide, with more than 1 billion users and 1 billion hours
of videos watched every day [70], and (2) it is targeted by
aggressive behavior and extremism [44], as recently acknowl-
edged by Google [8].
Moreover, prior work [30] shows that YouTube is the most
heavily targeted platform by hateful and alt-right communities
within 4chan, and in particular the Politically Incorrect board
(/pol/). 4chan-led raids typically start with a user posting a link
to a YouTube video on /pol/, often with comments like “you
know what to do,” resulting into a spike in the number of hate-
ful comments on the YouTube video. The authors of [30] also
examine the degree of synchronous commenting behavior be-
tween 4chan and YouTube, validating it in terms of the rate of
hate comments on the video page, as well as commenter ac-
count overlap. However, besides providing a characterization
that identifies when a raid has occurred, previous work has not
proposed any solutions to mitigate the problem.
In this paper, we propose a proactive approach towards
curbing coordinated hate attacks against YouTube users.
Rather than looking at attacks as they happen, or at known abu-
sive accounts, we investigate whether we can automatically
identify YouTube videos that are likely to be raided. We
present a system that relies on multiple features of YouTube
videos, such as title, category, thumbnail preview, as well
as audio transcripts, to build a model of the characteristics
of videos that are commonly raided. This also allows us to
gain an understanding of what content attracts raids, i.e., why
these videos are raided. We use a ground truth dataset of 428
raided YouTube videos obtained from [30], comparing them to
15K regular YouTube videos that were not targeted by raiders.
Based on our analysis, we then build classification models to
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assess, at upload time, whether a video is likely to be raided in
the future. We actually rely on an ensemble of classifiers, each
looking at a different element of the video (metadata, thumb-
nails, and audio transcripts), and build an ensemble detection
algorithm that performs quite well, reaching AUC values of up
to 94%.
Our work is an important first step towards curbing raids
on video sharing platforms, as we shows that proactive mea-
sures can work to detect videos targeted by coordinated hate
attacks. Providers like YouTube could integrate these tech-
niques in multiple configurations: for instance, they could an-
alyze every video that gets uploaded to the platform and take
particular precautions for the ones that are flagged as in dan-
ger of being raided (e.g., vetting or rate-limiting the comments
that they receive). Alternatively, they could monitor links to
YouTube videos posted on communities that are know to or-
ganize raids against other platforms (e.g., 4chan’s /pol/), auto-
matically learning which of these videos are actually likely to
be targeted, and then take similar precautions.
In summary, our paper makes the following contributions:
• We analyze and model YouTube raids, perpetrated by
users of 4chan, using a ground truth dataset of 428 raided
videos;
• We build an ensemble classification model geared to
determine the likelihood that a YouTube video will be
raided in the future, using a number of features (video
metadata, audio transcripts, thumbnails). Our system
achieves an AUC of 94% when analyzing raided videos
posted on 4chan with respect to all other non raided
videos in our dataset.
• We provide concrete suggestions as to how video plat-
forms can deploy our methodology to detect raids and
mitigate their impact.
2 Background & Datasets
Hate attacks on online services can happen in a number of
ways. In this paper, we focus on organized attacks – “raids”
– which are orchestrated by a community and target users
of other platforms [30, 37]. In this section, we provide an
overview of online raids, and describe how fringe communi-
ties organize and orchestrate them. We then detail the datasets
collected for our experiments.
2.1 Anatomy of Online Raids
Unlike “typical” attacks on online services like DDoS [55],
a raid is an attack on the community that calls a service home.
The goal is not to disrupt the service itself, but rather to cause
chaos and turmoil to the users of the service. As such, online
raids are a growing socio-technical problem. Nonetheless, it is
hard to provide a precise definition of them. In the following,
we offer a description of them based on previous work as well
as our own observations of raids in the wild.
A prototypical raid begins with a user finding a YouTube
video and posting a link to it on a 3rd party community,
Figure 1: Example of comments from raided YouTube videos, with
usernames and profile pictures removed for the sake of privacy.
e.g. 4chan. In some cases, the original poster, or another
user, might also write comments like “you know what to do.”
Shortly after, the YouTube video starts receiving a large num-
ber of negative and hateful comments. Overall, raids present
a couple of key characteristics. For instance, they typically at-
tract a large number of users, joining an effort to explicitly
disrupt any productive/civil discourse that might be occurring.
This is different from what would normally happen with pos-
sibly controversial videos (say, e.g., a video posted by social
justice advocates), which also attract opposing points of view,
though organically. The raid often generates a sudden, unex-
pected attack by otherwise uninvolved users.
Consider, for example, the comments from a few raided
videos showed in Figure 1. The first comment specifically
calls out the racist ideology espoused on 4chan (and based
on the comparative analysis between different 4chan boards
from [30], this commenter is likely referring to /pol/ in partic-
ular). Another user—presumably a 4chan user—responds by
telling the commenter to kill themselves. The next set of com-
ments refers to the racist meme that Italians are not “white.”
The first response also uses the anti-semitic triple parenthesis
meme [68] to imply that the TED organization (the source of
the video being commented on) is a tool of a supposed Jew-
ish conspiracy. When another user responds that Italians are in
fact white, the original commenter provides a justification for
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Figure 2: Distribution of videos from [30], according to the synchro-
nization of their comments with the 4chan thread where the URL was
posted and the number of hate words that appear in the comments.
his assertion: that Italians are too Mediterranean to be consid-
ered white. In the final set of comments, a user asks why the
“raiders” are even watching the video if they have issues with
the poster’s opinions; the response is that they need to ensure
that the video’s poster (a minority) “knows his place.”
Another characteristics of raids is their semi-coordinated
nature. While a sudden increase in hateful comments to a
video is obvious to an outside observer, what is not obvious
is the fact that these comments are part of a coordinated at-
tack. In fact, those participating in a raid may even discuss the
“fruits of their labor” on the 3rd party site that they organize
on. For example, as discussed in [30], /pol/ threads serve as
an aggregation point for raiders; users will post a hateful com-
ment to the targeted YouTube video, and then brag about it on
/pol/. This observation led the authors to identify videos that
might have been targeted by a raid by measuring the number
of “hate comments per second” (HCPS) and the synchroniza-
tion between the comments posted on the YouTube video and
those appearing on the /pol/ thread advocating for a raid.
By playing with the synchronization lag and the HPCS met-
ric, the authors of [30] proceeded to identify a set of videos
that had received raids during their observation period. This
approach was further validated by showing an increase in the
overlap of YouTube accounts between videos as the synchro-
nization lag decreases: the same accounts were more likely to
be involved in the YouTube comments. In other words, it was
not random YouTube users leaving racist comments, but rather
“serial” raiders almost assuredly originating from /pol/. In Fig-
ure 2, we show the distribution of the videos in the dataset
by [30] according to synchronization lag and HCPS: observe
that, the closer the lag is to zero, the higher rate of hate com-
ments received by the video.
2.2 Datasets
To better understand online raids against YouTube videos,
and develop a proactive detection system, we first need to col-
lect real world data. To this end, we use three datasets, also
summarized in Table 1:
1. We collect a set of videos that were raided after being
posted on /pol/, as identified by previous work [30];
Type Source # Videos
Raided 4chan (/pol/) 428
Non-Raided 4chan (/pol/) 789
Random YouTube 14,444
Table 1: Overview of our dataset of YouTube videos. Source denotes
the place where the link to the YouTube video was collected.
2. We gather a set of videos that were posted on /pol/ which
were not raided;
3. We retrieve a set of random YouTube videos, which we
use to compare raided videos against, aiming to highlight
the differences in their characteristics.
Raided videos posted on 4chan (ground truth). We start by
collecting a ground truth dataset of raided YouTube videos.
As discussed above, fringe communities within 4chan are of-
ten responsible for organizing raids against YouTube users that
promote ideas that they do not agree with. Therefore, we ob-
tain the dataset of YouTube links posted on 4chan over a 2.5-
month period in 2016 (June to mid September) from the au-
thors of [30]. For our purposes, we want to choose conser-
vative thresholds to ensure we only select videos that we are
confident have been raided. Thus, based on Figure 2, we select
videos with HCPS > 10−4 and time lag less than a day, re-
sulting in 428 videos (out of 1,217) that were raided. We man-
ually examined this ground truth dataset to further increase our
confidence that they were indeed raided.
Non-raided videos posted on 4chan. Although many
YouTube videos posted on 4chan’s /pol/ are victims of raids,
obviously not all videos posted attract hateful behavior. Fig-
ure 2 shows that videos that have a high lag compared to the
thread in which they are posted are unlikely to see much hate-
ful behavior. To compare the characteristics of these videos
to the raided ones, we build a second dataset with videos that
were posted on 4chan but were not raided. We use conserva-
tive thresholds to ensure that we do not mistakenly included
raided videos: to be part of this set, a video needs to have both
a synchronization lag of more than one day compared to the
4chan thread it was posted in, and to have a HCPS of 0. Ulti-
mately, this yields 789 non-raided videos.
Random YouTube videos. Finally, in order to draw compar-
isons with the ground truth of raided videos, we need to collect
a set of YouTube videos that are likely not raided. We use the
YouTube API and download 50 of the top videos across a va-
riety of categories. In the end, we collected 14,444 videos, se-
lected following the same distribution of (YouTube) categories
as those linked on 4chan.
Ethical considerations. Our data collection received ethics
approval from our institution (details are conceived to pre-
serve this submission’s anonymity). We also took a few steps
to follow standard ethical practices, e.g., discarded any per-
sonal information about the users uploading or commenting
on the videos, encrypted data at rest, etc.
3
3 Video Processing and Analysis
We now present the methods used to analyze the characteris-
tics of the YouTube videos in our dataset that received raids.
We look at the metadata of a video, its audio transcript, as
well as the thumbnail preview. We then use the insights de-
rived from this analysis to build a machine learning classifier
geared to determine whether a YouTube video is likely to re-
ceive a raid (see Section 5).
3.1 Metadata
In addition to the actual videos, we also collect the associ-
ated metadata, specifically: title, duration, category, descrip-
tion, and tags. Except for the duration, these fields are entered
by the user uploading the video, so they might not always be
meaningful or might even be missing. Naturally, title, dura-
tion, and description often play a major role in a user’s deci-
sion to watch the video as they are the first fields that they see.
Also, the tags provide an intuition of a video’s topics, and are
actually also used by YouTube to suggest other videos—in a
way, watching a suggested video might actually trigger a post
on 4chan. Looking at the category for videos posted on 4chan,
we anecdotally find that many of them include news, politics,
and ethnic issues.
Evidence of controversial topics. We perform term
frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) analysis on
the string metadata (title, tags, and description) to extract
information about the most used keywords in the different
groups of videos, finding that random videos often include
“Google,” “music,” and “love” (top 3 used words), as well
as “follow” and “subscribe.” By contrast, all videos posted
on 4chan include politics-related words such as “Hillary” and
“Trump,” or indications of racial content like “black”, while
only raided videos have certain words like “police,” “lives”
(likely related to the Black Lives Matter movement), or “Alex”
(referring to InfoWars’ Alex Jones, a conspiracy theorist sup-
porting of Trump, who is well known in alt-right circles).1
The differences in the topics used in the metadata are ex-
tremely important: search engines are affected by the content
of the metadata, especially tags; moreover YouTube suggests
videos to the user based on many of these fields. Overall, we
observe that random YouTube videos have few topics in com-
mon with the 4chan videos, while there are some similarities
between the set of videos posted on 4chan but not raided and
those that have been raided.
3.2 Audio Processing
The process to extract audio from each video involve five
steps. (1) First, we download YouTube videos in MPEG-4 for-
mat, with H.264 video and AAC audio codecs, then, (2) we
extract the corresponding stereo audio channels using the ffm-
peg tool at 44.1KHz sampling rate. (3) Both audio channels
are then mixed and down-sampled to 8KHz, using the sox util-
ity; this operation is necessary to have the same conditions be-
tween the YouTube audios and the samples used to train the
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alex Jones
Voice Activity Detection (VAD) system used in the follow-
ing step. (4) Next, we rely on a VAD module to discriminate
non-speech audio segments for further processing, and finally,
(5) we use an Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) system,
based on deep neural networks and trained with conversational
telephone data, to perform the speech-to-text transcription.
Voice Activity Detection. VAD is often used as an upstream
processing step intended to prevent unwanted data from enter-
ing later stages. The VAD system we use is based on [17] and
uses long short-term memory (LSTM) recurrent neural net-
works. We train it using 20 hours of call center data annotated
with speech and non-speech labels. The audio waveform is
parametrized by using 12 Mel frequency cepstral coefficients
(MFCC) at 10ms frame rate. The system is evaluated on 1.4
hours of call center data, with error rates ranging from 5% to
8% with 20 and 10 input frames, respectively.
Automatic Speech Recognition. We use an ASR system for
English from [41], trained using the Kaldi toolkit [53] and the
Switchboard corpus [24], which includes around 300 hours of
conversational speech. In particular, we adapt the Switchboard
training recipe for nnet2 models from [53], and train two dif-
ferent systems. The first uses a GMM/HMM, specifically, a
triphone unit with a decision tree of 5,500 leafs and a total of
90,000 Gaussian mixtures, The second re-uses the first model
but switches Gaussian mixtures with a vanilla DNN with 4
hidden layers and 1,024 neurons per layer. The GMM sys-
tem makes use of “discriminative” feature transformations for
GMM alignment.
For the language modeling, we estimate a trigram language
model using MIT Language Model Toolkit with Kneser-Ney
Smoothing [31]. It is worth mentioning that we do not perform
lattice re-scoring with any other language model. The pronun-
ciation dictionary, an orthographic/phonetic mapping, is from
CMUdict, an open source pronunciation dictionary.2 The tar-
get lexicon accounts for more than 40K words. Note that nei-
ther “bad words” nor slang terms are in the original Switch-
board lexicon. To evaluate the ASR performance, we use a
separated subset of the same Switchboard database accounting
for 5 hours of speech. The results obtained by the DNN based
system, trained using only the Switchboard dataset, show a
13.05% Word Error Rate (WER). We also run the speech
recognition system on the videos dataset and employ segmen-
tal Minimum Bayes-Risk decoding (sMBR) [25] to generate
the best decoding transcription, also known as the one-best
transcription.
Evidence of controversial topics. Similar to what done with
the metadata, we also analyze the transcribed words to com-
pare the different datasets. We observe that most YouTube
videos have a lot of verbal communication. Specifically, 86%
of the videos have at least 10 words spoken with the me-
dian and average video transcription containing 317 and 1,200
words respectively. We also look at whether or not some terms
are more prevalent in raided YouTube videos, by averaging
the TF-IDF vectors separately for the two classes (raided and
2http://www.speech.cs.cmu.edu/cgi-bin/cmudict
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(a) Non-raided. (b) Non-raided. (c) Raided. (d) Raided.
Figure 3: Sample of thumbnails from our dataset.
non-raided videos), and examining the most influential terms.
We find words like “black,” “police,” “white,” “shot,” “world,”
“gun,” “war,” “American,” “government,” and “law” in the top
20 terms in raided videos (in addition to some stop words and
extremely popular terms that were excluded). Of these, the
only word that appears among the top 20 in the non-raided
videos is “government.” The top terms for non-raided videos
are different: they include words like “god,” “fun,” “movie,”
and “love.”
3.3 Thumbnails
On YouTube, each video is also represented by an image
thumbnail, used, e.g., in search results. Thumbnails provide
viewers with a quick snapshot of the content of each video.
Although users can manually select them [69], by default,
thumbnails are automatically selected from the video and the
user can choose one of three suggested options.
Using the YouTube API, we extract all available thumbnails
from the videos in our dataset—specifically, using a combi-
nation of image recognition and content extraction tools (see
below). Note that out of 2,895 videos, 430 (276 non-raided
and 154 raided) thumbnails are not available. In a few cases
this happens because the videos were not accessible via the
API when we attempted to collect the thumbnails (which was
done separately from the video itself, comments, and meta-
data), but, most of the time, the thumbnail has not been up-
loaded properly and were therefore inaccessible even though
the video was still available.
Image recognition. To extract meaningful information from
the thumbnails, we use deep neural networks [34, 65]. A large
corpus of images can be used to train a deep neural network:
each image is annotated with visible context that is used as
ground truth, and the resulting network can then recognize ob-
jects appearing in the images and generate an accurate descrip-
tion of them.
We build on the work by Vinyals et al. [65] to train a gen-
erative model on top of a deep Neural Network (NN), more
specifically a convolutional NN and a language-generating re-
current NN. The model is built from a very extensive dataset
of annotated images (over 300,000) collected by Microsoft’s
COCO (Common Objects in Context) project.3 The system
outputs a detailed description of the image provided as input.
Context extraction. For each thumbnail, we then output a de-
scription that represents the semantics involved in the image.
Figure 3 shows images from four examples of different thumb-
nails, two in the raided category and two in the non-raided
3http://mscoco.org/
Type Non-Raid Raid Diff
Clothing 25.5% 33.4% 7.9%
Male-Gender 52.4% 59.1% 6.7%
Device 44.3% 50.7% 6.4%
Vehicle 8.9% 12.4% 3.4%
Animal 9.2% 5.8% 3.4%
Sport 22.6% 20.3% 2.2%
Color 12.5% 10.7% 1.8%
Joy 1.6% 2.8% 1.2%
Culture 1.6% 0.7% 0.9%
Food 2.45% 1.6% 0.8%
Female-Gender 9.8% 10.3% 0.5%
Nature 6.8% 6.8% 0.02%
Table 2: Topics found across videos with thumbnails.
category. The following descriptions have been automatically
inferred from each of the images: (a) a white plate topped with
a pile of food, (b) a couple of women standing next to each
other, (c) a man in a suit and tie standing in front of a TV, and
(d) a woman sitting in front of a laptop computer.
Note that each caption extracted not only identifies the main
actor within the picture (a plate, a couple of women, or a man),
but also the background activity. However, these descriptions
are automatically inferred based on a model bounded by the
objects in the training images-set, thus, there might be mis-
interpretations. Nonetheless, we believe that the 300K image
COCO dataset is large and diverse enough to meet our needs.
Evidence of controversial topics. We use topic-modeling to
abstract the descriptions obtained from the images using Con-
cepNet [56]. We extract categories related to sports, joy, un-
derage, gender, to name a few. For example, some of the
words in the joy category are “happy,” “smile,” “wedding,” or
“Christmas.” Table 2 shows a summary of the prevalence of
words related to any of these categories across videos in our
dataset. We observe that there are a number of common top-
ics displayed across both classes (e.g., nature). Likewise, fe-
male gender references are almost equal in both classes, with a
slight bias towards raid videos. Interestingly, the case of male
gender references is clearly biased towards raided videos, with
males appearing in about 52% of the non-raided videos and
in 59% of the raided ones. Reference to clothes (e.g., “tie”,
“dress”, “jacket”, “uniform”) is the most distinctive category
with a 7.9% difference between each class.
This indicates that there are a number of thumbnails whose
context can be used to characterize videos that could poten-
tially be raided. However, numbers also indicate that thumb-
nails alone might not be able to fully model the differences be-
tween the two classes. Our intuition at this point is that thumb-
nails can contribute towards the classification decisions, but
they will not outperform other feature sets.
4 Proactive Detection
In this section, we introduce our approach to provide a proac-
tive detection tool for videos targeted by hate attacks on online
services, and on YouTube in particular. Our goal is to system-
atize this task, using supervised learning—specifically, relying
on a set of machine learning classifiers, each of which focuses
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Figure 4: Architecture of our proactive detection system.
on a different set of features extracted from online videos.
In this section, we describe the set of features we use, mo-
tivated by the findings reported in the previous section. Since
not all the videos contain the same information, we present
three independent classifiers, one for each feature set, then
show how to ensemble and properly balance the different pre-
dictions to provide one single decision.
4.1 Overview
A high-level description of our detection system is pre-
sented in Figure 4. The system is first trained using a dataset of
raided and non-raided videos from different sources (we de-
scribe the different settings in Section 5.1). We do so to obtain
the key elements discussed next, which will be used to predict
whether a video could be targeted by hate attacks or not.
(1) A set of prediction models C = {C1, . . . , Ci } that out-
put the probability Ci(σ1, . . . , σn) = Pi[Y = raid |
(σ1, . . . , σn)] of each video Y being raided given a feature
vector (σ1, . . . , σn) obtained from different elements i of the
video. Each of these prediction models are referred to as indi-
vidual classifiers.
(2) A weighted model f(C) = ∑wi · Ci that combines all
predictions in C, where each of the classifiers Ci is weighted
by wi based on the performance obtained on a validation set.
This set is different from the training set (used to build the
individual probabilities) and the testing set (used to measure
the efficacy of the classifiers). The process of weighting the
individual predictors also serves as a way to calibrate the out-
put of the probabilities. The final classifier will then output a
decision based on a voting such that
f =
{
raid if f(C) < 
non-raid otherwise,
where  is a threshold typically set to
⌊∑
wi
2
⌋
+ 1.
To ease presentation, we refer to the model presented in
(2) as weighted-vote. One can simplify the model by giving
equal weight to all wi (typically wi = 1) and obtaining a
nominal value for Ci before voting. In other words, apply-
ing a threshold for each Ci (e.g., 0.5) and creating an equal
vote among participants. We refer to this non-weighted voting
system as majority-vote. One can further simplify the scheme
by combining each individual prediction using the arithmetic
mean of the output the probabilities—this is known as an
average-prediction system. More details about the each of the
classifiers are presented later on—in particular, Section 4.3.1
and Section 4.3.2 present the architecture of the individual
classifiers, and Section 4.3.3 the architecture of the ensemble
used in our operational setting.
Note that the parameters (i.e., wi, , and the thresholds for
deciding the class in each Ci) used in both majority-vote and
average-prediction are fixed and do not require calibration.
Thus, the validation set is not used in these two modes.
4.2 Feature Engineering
In the following, we discuss how we create the features vec-
tors used by the different classifiers.
Our system extracts features from three different sources:
(1) structured attributes of the metadata of the video, (2) fea-
tures extracted from raw audio, and (3) features extracted
from raw images (thumbnails). Based on the preprocessing de-
scribed in Section 3, we transform non-textual elements of a
video (i.e., audio and images) into a text representation. Other
textual elements such as the title of the video and the tags are
kept as text. These textual representations are then transformed
into a fixed-size input space vector of categorical features.
This is done by tokenizing the input text to obtain a nomi-
nal discrete representation of the words described on it. Thus,
feature vectors will have a limited number of possible values
given by the bag of words representing the corpus in the train-
ing set. When extracting features from the text, we count the
frequency that a word appears in the text.
Since in large text corpus certain words–e.g., articles–
can appear rather frequently without carrying meaningful in-
formation, we transform occurrences into a score based on
two relative frequencies known as term-frequency and in-
verse document-frequency (TF-IDFs). Intuitively, the term fre-
quency represents how “popular” a word is in a text (in the fea-
6
ture vector), and the inverse document-frequency represents
how “popular” a word appears, provided that it does not appear
very frequently in other in the corpus (the feature space). More
formally, we compute as idf(t) = log 1+ns1+df(s,t) + 1, where ns
is the total number of samples and df(s, t) is the number of
samples containing term t.
As for the thumbnails, after extracting the most represen-
tative descriptions per image, we remove the least informa-
tive elements and only retain entities (nouns), actions (verbs),
and modifiers (adverbs and adjectives). Each element in the
caption is processed to a common base to reduce inflectional
forms and derived forms (known as stemming). Further, we
abstract the descriptions obtained from the images using topic-
modeling as described earlier.
In our implementation, we extract features from only one
image of the video (i.e., the thumbnail). Again, this is mainly
because the thumbnails are typically purposely selected by the
user and encapsulate semantically relevant context. However,
we emphasize that our architecture could support the extrac-
tion of features from every frame in the video.
4.3 Prediction Models
We use three independent classifiers to estimate the like-
lihood of a video being targeted by hate attacks. These are
built to operate independently, possibly when a new video is
uploaded. Each classifier is designed to model traits from dif-
ferent aspects of the video as described above. Available deci-
sions are later combined to provide one unified output.
We use three different classifiers, in an ensemble, because
features obtained from different parts of a video are inherently
incomplete, as some fields are optional and others might not
be meaningful for certain video. For instance, a music video
might not report a lengthy transcript, or a thumbnail might not
contain distinguishable context. Since any reliable decision
system should be able to deal with incomplete data, ensemble
methods are well-suited to this setting. Moreover, ensembles
often perform better than single classifiers overall [16].
4.3.1 Metadata and thumbnail classifiers
We build a prediction model such that Pi(X = raid) based
on the features extracted from the metadata (PM ) and from
the image thumbnails (PI ). The architecture of these two pre-
dictors is flexible and accepts a range of classifiers. Our cur-
rent implementation supports Random Forests (RFs), Extra
Randomized Trees (XTREEs), and Support Vector Machines
(SVM), both radial and linear. For our experiments, we select
RF as the base classifier for PT and SVM with linear kernel
for PM . Both SVM and RF have been successfully applied
to different aspects of security in the past (e.g., fraud detec-
tion [7]) and have been shown to outperform other classifiers
(when compared to 180 classifiers used for real-world prob-
lems [22]).
4.3.2 Audio-transcript classifier
Before feeding the transcripts to the classifier, we remove any
words that have a transcription confidence ptrans < 0.5 as
these are likely incorrectly transcribed and unrelated to the
video context (including them will only confuse the classifier).
Note that this only removes 9.2% of transcribed words. Addi-
tionally, the transcripts contain a lot of repeated terms that are
mostly exclamations such as “uh uh,” or “hm hm,” Finally, the
transcripts contain tags for non-verbal communication such as
noise, laughter, etc., which we leave in the text as they do carry
predictive power.
There are several choices in terms of selecting a classifier
for long sequences of text. We experiment with transitional
TF-IDF based approaches, Convolutional Networks, and Re-
current Neural Networks (RNN), ultimately opting for the lat-
ter since it yields the best performance and is quite effective at
understanding sequences of words and interpreting the over-
all context. We also use an attention mechanism [4] as this
can help an RNN “focus” on sequences of words that might
indicate potentially raided videos. Before feeding any text to
the network, we also need to transform each transcript to a
sequence of words. Because neural networks process data in
mini-batches, all transcripts within a mini-batch must have the
same length (number of words). Transcripts with more words
than the sequence length will be trimmed whereas samples
with less words are left-padded with zeros (the model will
learn zeros carry no information). Ideally, we want to setup
a sequence length that is large enough to contain the text from
all samples in a mini-batch but not too long to waste resources
(feeding zeros in the network). We thus take the 95th per-
centile of length (with respect to the number of words) in the
input corpus as the optimal sequence length (i.e., 5% of sam-
ples will be truncated). This results in a sequence length of
2,500 words.
The first layer of the network performs a word embed-
ding, mapping each word to a high-dimensional vector. We
do this because word embedding is effective for text classi-
fication tasks, especially when having relatively few training
samples. We use pre-trained word embeddings from GloVe,
which was constructed on more than 2 billion tweets that map
each word into a 200-dimension vector. If a word is not found
in the GloVe dataset, we initialize a vector of random weights,
which the word embedding layer eventually learns from the
input data. Next, after experimenting with several choices for
the RNN architecture we use a layer of 256 GRU units. To
reduce over-fitting we use a recurrent dropout with p = 0.5
as it empirically provided the best results across our datasets.
On top of the recurrent layer, we add an attention layer as we
are working with large sequence lengths (2,500 words). The
network at this stage outputs one activation at the end of the
whole sequence (the whole transcript).
We then add a fully-connected (dense) layer to the recurrent
part to mix the recurrent layer outputs and bring the dimen-
sionality down to 128 units. The output layer is another dense
layer with one neuron per class. We use softmax as the activa-
tion function to normalize output values between 0 and 1.
For training, we use mini-batches of 32 transcripts (i.e., the
input is of shape 32x2,500). We use categorical cross-entropy
as a loss function and Adam as the optimization function. We
allow a maximum of 100 epochs and use a separate valida-
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tion set to perform early stopping: training is interrupted if
the validation loss does not drop over 10 consecutive epochs,
at which point the weights of the best epoch are restored. Fi-
nally, we note that our implementation uses Keras [36] with
Theano [64] as a back-end.
4.3.3 Ensemble classifier
The objective of the ensemble method is to aggregate the pre-
dictions of the different base estimators. Each classifier indi-
vidually models the likelihood that a video will be be targeted
by hate attacks based on the set of features. The idea is that
the decisions are then combined together so that the ensemble
is able to make a more informed prediction. This not only al-
lows for more robust predictions (in terms of confidence), but
can also result in a more accurate prediction. We design our
ensemble method to take a weighted vote of the available pre-
dictions. To compute the best-performing set of weights, we
estimate a function f that takes as input each of the individ-
ual probabilities and outputs the aggregated prediction. Dur-
ing training this function learns from an independent testing
set, and will be used during testing to weight each prediction
model Pi. Formally,
f(PM , PI , PT ) = {raid,non-raid}.
For the decision function f of our weighted-vote algorithm
(see Section 4.1), we use a distribution function that models
how an expected probability in the testing set is affected by
individual decisions Pi in a multiple regression. This function
is approximated in the following form:
f =
n∑
j=1
wjpij , i = 1, · · · , p
where p is the number of individual estimators and n is the
number of observations in the validation set. This can be inter-
preted as the sum of the wights w times the probability score
pi ∈ Pi given by the individual classifiers in the weighted vot-
ing system.
In our implementations, we use different underlying clas-
sification algorithms for estimating f . However, in the next
section, we only present the results for each of the individual
classifiers and two ensemble methods, namely, weighted-vote,
and average-prediction. For the former, weights are fit using
XTREE [23]. For the latter, we also test different settings, in
particular, we try settings where one of the classifier is given
a fixed weight of w = 0 and we average the others. The main
reason is to understand how each of the individual classifiers
influence each other, though we only report results for the best
setting.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we present the setup and the results of our ex-
perimental evaluation.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Our main objective is to show that we can distinguish be-
tween raided and non-raided videos. However, there are sev-
eral subtasks we also want to evaluate, aiming to better charac-
terize the problem and understand how our classifiers perform.
Experiments. We start by trying to distinguish between ran-
dom YouTube videos and those that are linked from /pol/.
Next, we distinguish between the videos that are raided and
those that are not (whether posted on /pol/ or not). Finally, we
predict whether videos posted on 4chan will be raided.
More specifically, in EXPERIMENT 1, we set out to measure
whether our classifiers are able to distinguish between videos
linked from /pol/ and a random video uploaded to YouTube,
aiming to gather insight into the ability to discriminate be-
tween videos potentially raided vs. those that are not at risk at
all. Then, EXPERIMENT 2 evaluates whether or not the classi-
fier can distinguish between any non-raided video (i.e., regard-
less of whether it is a random YouTube video or one posted
on 4chan) and videos that will be raided. Finally, in EXPERI-
MENT 3, we focus on videos posted on 4chan, and determine
which are going to be raided and which are not; this ensures
that we can not only predict whether a video was posted on
4chan, but whether or not the video will be raided.
Train, Test, and Validate Splits. We split our datasets into
three chunks: two for training and tuning parameters of the
ensemble (training and testing) and one for validation, and re-
port performance metrics on the latter. As we are dealing with
highly unbalanced classes (there are multiple orders of mag-
nitude more videos posted to YouTube than those posted to
4chan, let alone those that are raided), we balance the train-
ing and testing sets to model both classes properly, but leave
the validation set unbalanced. Leaving the training split unbal-
anced would make it difficult for our models to properly learn
the differences between the different classes. The validation
set, however, remains unbalanced to more realistically model
a real-world scenario.
The total number of videos in each split is proportion-
ally sampled depending on the less populated class, assigning
splits of 60%, 20%, and 20% to the training, testing, and vali-
dation sets. The more populated class uses the same amount of
samples for training and test, while it will have all the remain-
ing samples in the validation set. This procedure is repeated 10
times and the results are an average of the 10 different rounds.
Table 3 summarizes all settings in our experiments, along with
the number of samples used.
Evaluation Metrics. We evaluate our system using accuracy,
precision, recall, and F1-measure. Precision measures the per-
formance of our algorithm only for the values of the class of
interest, while recall measures the proportion of positives that
are correctly identified as such. The F1-measure is the har-
monic mean of precision and recall. Finally, accuracy quanti-
fies the proportion of correct predictions made in both classes.
Overall, these metrics are a good summary of the perfor-
mance of an classifier in terms of True Negatives (TN), False
Negatives (FN), False Positives (FP), and True Positives (TP);
however, they are not ideal for comparing results across differ-
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ID Description Training Test Validation
Exp. 1 Random YouTube vs. all 731+731 243+243 13,470+244
on 4chan
Exp. 2 All non-raided vs. raided 258+258 85+85 14,890+85
on 4chan
Exp. 3 Non-raided on 4chan vs. 258+258 85+85 446+85
raided on 4chan
Table 3: Number of samples used in our experiments. The sets are
balanced as there is the same amount of samples per each class (class
1 samples+class 2 samples) in training and test, while they are un-
balanced in the validation set.
ent experiments. Therefore, we will also plot the Area Under
the Curve (AUC), which reports the TP-rate (recall) against
the FP-rate (1 - recall).
5.2 Experimental Results
We now report the results of our experimental evaluations,
as per the settings introduced above. To ease presentation, we
only report metrics for the individual classifiers as well as two
ensemble methods: weighted-vote and average-prediction. We
do not report results for other ensemble classifiers (simple-
voting and the other underlying algorithms for estimating the
weights), since they under-perform in our experiments.
For weighted-vote, weights are fit using XTREE [23],
as described in Section 4.3.3. Also note that, for average-
prediction, we find that the thumbnails classifier tends to dis-
agree with the metadata and the transcripts classifiers com-
bined. Therefore, in this mode, we fix a weight of w = 0 for
the thumbnails classifier (i.e., wthumbnail = 0).
Experiment 1. As mentioned, in this experiment we study
whether we can predict that a video is linked from 4chan. Re-
sults are reported in Table 4. Overall, we find that we can cor-
rectly identify 92% of the videos (see average-prediction en-
semble), and maintain high recall. Since we are dealing with
a rather unbalanced validation set (in favor of the negative
class), it is not surprising that precision drops to values close
to 0, even though we have high accuracy.
Looking at the results obtained by the individual classi-
fiers, we note that metadata has the highest accuracy (0.91),
although audio-transcript scores highly as well (0.81), with
the weighted-vote ensemble classifier matching the best recall
from metadata (0.91). The best AUC value is the same be-
tween the metadata classifier and the weighted-vote ensemble
(0.96).
In Figure 5a, we also plot the ROC curve for all five clas-
sifiers. The individual AUC scores are 0.79, 0.96, 0.62 for the
transcripts, metadata, and thumbnails, respectively, while the
two ensembles (weighted-vote and average-prediction) score,
0.96 and 0.95, respectively. The weighted-vote ensemble has
the highest AUC throughout most of the x-axis, although, the
ROC curve essentially overlaps with that of the the meta-
data classifier. The two ensemble have different strengths: the
weighted-vote ensemble has the highest recall and AUC val-
ues, but the average-prediction (with wthumbnail = 0) has the
highest accuracy, precision, and F1-measure.
Experiment 2. In Figure 5b, we report the AUC when classi-
fying raided and non-raided videos—regardless of whether the
latter are random YouTube videos or non-raided ones posted
on 4chan. We find that the average-prediction ensemble classi-
fier correctly labels 90% of the videos—as shown in Table 4).
Unlike EXPERIMENT 1, among the individual classifiers, the
best performance is achieved by the audio-transcript classifier,
except for recall, where the metadata classifier performs best.
This setting also yields high recall (0.88) when combining all
classifiers into the weighted-vote ensemble. As in EXPERI-
MENT 1 the weighted-vote ensemble presents the highest re-
call and AUC, but the average-prediction has higher accuracy,
precision, and F1-measure. Figure 5b shows a similar situation
as in the previous experiment: the ROC curve for the metadata
classifier is really close to or overlapping with the ones for
the two ensemble. AUC equals to 0.61 for thumbnails, 0.79
for transcripts, and 0.94 for metadata. Whereas, the weighted-
vote ensemble achieves 0.94 AUC as the metadata individual
classifier, and average-prediction 0.92.
Experiment 3. Finally, we evaluate how well our models dis-
criminate between raided videos posted to 4chan and non-
raided videos also posted to 4chan. Our results confirm that
this is indeed the most challenging task. Intuitively, these
videos are much more similar to each other than those found
randomly on YouTube. This is because /pol/ is interested in a
particular type of content in general, regardless of whether or
not the video ends up raided. Nonetheless, as shown in Table 4,
around 75% of the videos are correctly classified by the best
performing classifier, i.e., the average-prediction ensemble.
This setting shows a clear case for the ensemble classifica-
tion yielding appreciably better performance. Overall, the in-
dividual classifiers, i.e., transcripts, metadata, and thumbnails
reach AUCs of 0.73, 0.79, and 0.56, respectively, whereas,
both the ensemble classifiers reach 0.80. Nevertheless, the
ROC curve in Figure 5c shows how the weighted-vote ensem-
ble is sometimes penalized by the weakest performing classi-
fier (i.e., thumbnails classifier). This is apparent by comparing
the differences between weighted-vote and average-prediction
(recall that wthumbnails = 0 in the latter).
5.3 Choosing an Ensemble
The goal of the our system is to make the best final “deci-
sion” possible given the choices made by the individual clas-
sifiers. In absolute terms, the weighted-vote (with XTREE as
baseline estimator) yields the best performance in all three ex-
periments in terms of recall (and overall AUC). In particular,
it outperforms the average-prediction ensemble in two of the
tasks: modeling videos from /pol/ (EXPERIMENT 1), and de-
tecting raided videos in general (EXPERIMENT 2). When re-
stricting our attention to the detection of raids of videos posted
on 4chan (EXPERIMENT 3), both ensemble methods are com-
parable in terms of recall. However, when looking at preci-
sion, we find that average-prediction outperforms weighted-
vote. The trade-off between having good precision and good
recall will have an important impact on the amount of vetting
work required by providers deploying our system, as we dis-
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EXPERIMENT 1 EXPERIMENT 2 EXPERIMENT 3
Classifier ACC PRE REC F1 AUC ACC PRE REC F1 AUC ACC PRE REC F1 AUC
transcripts 0.81 0.05 0.60 0.10 0.79 0.89 0.03 0.56 0.06 0.79 0.71 0.32 0.58 0.40 0.73
metadata 0.91 0.13 0.89 0.23 0.96 0.87 0.03 0.85 0.06 0.94 0.73 0.32 0.71 0.44 0.79
thumbnails 0.55 0.02 0.64 0.05 0.62 0.52 0.01 0.66 0.02 0.61 0.53 0.18 0.55 0.27 0.56
weighted-vote ensemble 0.89 0.12 0.91 0.21 0.96 0.85 0.03 0.88 0.05 0.94 0.74 0.34 0.69 0.45 0.80
average-prediction ensemble 0.92 0.15 0.85 0.26 0.95 0.90 0.04 0.82 0.07 0.92 0.75 0.35 0.69 0.46 0.80
Table 4: Results for EXPERIMENT 1 (videos posted on 4chan and random YouTube samples), EXPERIMENT 2 (raided videos posted on 4chan
and all non raided videos), and for EXPERIMENT 3 (non-raided videos posted on 4chan and raided videos posted on 4chan). ACC stands for
accuracy, PRE for precision, and REC for recall. The ensemble classifiers have different inputs: the weighted-vote classifier receives inputs
from all three the individual ones, while the average-prediction receives the inputs only from the metadata and the transcript classifier.
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Figure 5: ROC curves for each experiment. AUC values for Thumbnails, Transcripts, Metadata, and Ensemble classifiers, XTREE and Average
probabilities.
cuss in more detail in Section 6.
In the following, we provide an explanation as to why the
two ensemble classifiers report similar results in some exper-
iments and different ones in others. When using a base esti-
mator to fit the best weights for the individual classifiers, we
observe a bias towards the decisions made by the metadata
classifier. This is expected, as this classifier is the one that per-
forms best among the individual classifiers (and substantially
so in both EXPERIMENT 1 and EXPERIMENT 2). On the con-
trary, the thumbnails classifier performs worst, except for re-
call in EXPERIMENT 2. As for the precision, the thumbnails
classifier always perform the worst.
We highlight that our data includes videos with partially-
available features. When this happens, the ensemble classifier
is forced to make a decision based on the other inputs. This
is precisely the case for the thumbnails, which are not always
available. This is why we evaluated the average-prediction en-
semble method forcing a weight wthumbnails = 0. In this set-
ting, the weighted-vote method with XTREE provided similar
results, since XTREE initially assigned a low weight (although
not exactly 0) to the thumbnails.
Overall, with the average-prediction method, accuracy is al-
ways better than for both the metadata and the XTREE ensem-
ble classifiers. This also applies for precision and F1-measure.
This means that this configuration reduces the number of false
positives and, as a consequence, is slightly more accurate. In
other words, this highlights how, when the individual classi-
fiers have similar performance, the ensemble is better than the
best options among the single classifiers. In fact, the metadata
and transcripts classifiers have different performances, but the
thumbnails classifier differs the most.
6 Discussion
The experiments presented above show that we can model the
characteristics of YouTube videos which are likely to be raided
by users of third-party hateful communities. In other words,
the results make an encouraging case that automated machine
learning techniques can be used to prevent or mitigate the
effects of aggression on video sharing platforms. What still
needs to be ironed out is how our techniques could be inte-
grated and deployed by mainstream providers like YouTube.
Although a definitive path to adoption is out of scope for this
paper, we discus this aspect a bit next.
We start by noting that our system is really geared to iden-
tify videos that are at risk of being raided, thus, YouTube could
use it as a filter, i.e., flagging videos that are risky and/or might
require particular attention. The “risk” can be derived from
the probability output of the ensemble, or any of the individ-
ual classifiers, and adjusted to minimize the number of missed
detections (videos that will be raided but that the system has
not flagged), i.e., maintaining high recall. Tuning the model to
balance the overall number of flagged videos as well ensuring
that they are indeed at high risk can help reduce the impact
of false positives. Given that our datasets are extremely unbal-
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anced, high precision, on the other hand, is not a top priority.
As mentioned above, the system would flag videos likely to be
raided, thus, helping to tackle the problem of aggression by re-
ducing the videos that need to be monitored. While this would
certainly reduce the amount of human labor involved in deal-
ing with raids, it could also be used to focus costlier detection
systems on high risk videos.
Our evaluation also showed that we can distinguish videos
that are likely to be raided from regular YouTube videos with
high accuracy. This means that YouTube could deploy our sys-
tem at upload time, determining the likelihood of a video to be
raided at some point in the future. The platform could then
adopt mitigation strategies for videos that prove risky, for ex-
ample by manually moderating the comments to such videos.
This is a practice already employed by YouTube [52], how-
ever, at the moment, the efficacy of this moderation has been
questioned [21] due to the sheer volume of content, in addition
to YouTube’s focus on removing inappropriate videos instead
of protecting users against raids.
We estimate, however, that only 16% of videos would re-
quire any action—an estimation based on EXPERIMENT 2.
While this might appear to be a very large number, it is still
less than having to monitor all videos. Moreover, additional
automated tools could be deployed to check whether a raid
is actually occurring before being passed along for human
review. Furthermore, YouTube has recently pledged to hire
10,000 new workers to monitor content [21], but deploying
our system could reduce the need for this many humans, or at
worst, allow them to focus on higher impact content.
Then, EXPERIMENT 3 demonstrates that, when provided
with videos linked from fringe communities such as /pol/, our
system can successfully identify those videos that are likely to
be raided with reasonable accuracy. This is a much more dif-
ficult task, and thus accuracy is lower, since videos are very
often being posted to /pol/ without the actual intent of having
raiders show up in the first place. Furthermore, the number of
videos posted on /pol/ is much smaller than those uploaded to
YouTube as a whole—for instance, the /pol/ dataset from [30]
contains links to 93K YouTube videos posted over a period
of 3 months. Among these links, we only selected those that
had crystal clear evidence of raids by restricting the thresholds
of HCPS and time lag (see Section 2.2), also discarding videos
which could have been raided from the non-raided group. This
choice is extremely conservative (yielding 428 videos), aim-
ing to have a reliable ground truth on which to evaluate the
system. Although we could have relaxed our thresholds a bit
and obtained higher accuracy, the applicability to real-world
use cases would likely have been affected, as our ground truth
dataset would have included videos that had controversial or
combative statements, but were not actually raided.
Also note that /pol/, though a very good example of a tight-
knit community used to coordinate and disrupt other social
groups, is not the only community responsible for perform-
ing raids against YouTube videos. Other Web communities,
e.g,. Reddit [54] or Kiwi Farms [20] also regularly take part in
raiding activity. The same techniques presented here, however,
can be used to detect raids from other communities.
Finally, it might perhaps be tempting to dismiss the rel-
atively low occurrence of raids, vis-a`-vis the number of
YouTube videos posted every day, as being a niche problem.
On the contrary, harassment and bullying on YouTube are
widely recognized as a serious issue by authorities on the mat-
ter [47], and news reports are filled with ghastly stories [50]
and advice on how to deal with hateful and harassing YouTube
comments in particular [15, 26]. Although we are not aware
of any suicide cases directly linked to YouTube raids, victims
have indeed been active on YouTube [48, 29], and thus raids
pose very serious safety risks. Overall, even if the majority of
content on YouTube (and other social media platforms) tends
to be “safe,” we should not discard the outsized effects that this
negative behavior has. From a purely pragmatic point of view,
advertisers providing the primary income stream for sites like
YouTube have been re-thinking their reliance on social media
in light of the recent surge in anti-social behavior [58]. From
a societal point of view, raiding behavior is a pressing con-
cern; it is a direct threat to free speech and civil discourse, and
causes emotional distress that can lead to dire consequences.
The efforts of the research community have enabled the long
tail of the Web to succeed, building technologies that democra-
tized information and shrunk the world. Thus, while raids on
YouTube videos do occur in the long tail, we argue that dis-
missing them as being too rare is an abdication of our social
responsibility.
7 Related Work
YouTube is used every day by millions of individuals to share
various kinds of videos, e.g., music, lectures, gaming, video
blogs, etc. [51]. Organized groups are also active on the plat-
form; some use it to reach and grow their network of support
and organize activities, while others to propel radicalization
and initiatives against other groups. Previous work has looked
at the use of YouTube by LGBT users for self-disclosure [27],
for anti- or pro-anorexia [49], fat stigmatization [32], sharing
violent content [67], far-right propaganda [18], as well as Jihad
and self-radicalization [13]. These topics often attract consid-
erable attention and typically lead to unwanted behavior stud-
ied, e.g., in the context of swearing, abusive, hateful, or flam-
ing comments, as well as activity against the video poster and
its supporters [43, 33].
Prior work has studied controversial YouTube videos aim-
ing to understand what types of comments and user reaction
certain categories of videos attract. For instance, [3] measure
civic behavioral intention upon exposure to highly or lowly
arousing videos showing cyberbullying activity, while [40]
study user-posted “ranting” videos, which, although appearing
to be aggressive, actually cause subtle differences in how they
engage other users. Researchers have also focused on bullying
and hate speech on, e.g., Twitter [9, 11] or Yahoo News and
Finance [46]. By contrast, we focus on hateful activity against
YouTube videos, and in particular on studying the types of
videos that are more likely to be targeted by attacks.
Recent studies also analyze YouTube videos’ comments to
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detect hate speech, bullying, and aggression via swearing in
political videos. [38] and [39] investigate whether aggressive
behavior (in online comments) can be contagious, observing
mimicry of verbal aggression via swearing comments against
Donald Trump’s campaign channel. Interestingly, this aggres-
sive emotional state can lead to contagious effects through tex-
tual mimicry. In this paper, we build on previous work on char-
acterizing raiding behavior on YouTube, presenting a data-
driven approach to identify which videos are likely to be the
target of a raid.
Another line of work has looked at offensive or harmful
YouTube videos and how to automatically detect them. This
is an orthogonal problem to ours, as we look at videos posted
with a legitimate purpose, that are later victim of coordinated
attacks. Sureka et al. [61] use social network analysis to iden-
tify extremist videos on YouTube, while [2] detects violent and
abusive videos, by mining the video’s metadata such as lin-
guistic features in the title and description, popularity of video,
duration and category. Finally, Agarwal and Sureka [1] search
for malicious and hateful videos using a topical crawler, best-
first search, and shark-search for navigating nodes and links
on YouTube.
Moreover, Marathe and Shirsat [42] study detection tech-
niques used for other problems, e.g., spam detection, and as-
sess whether they could be applied to raids. Also, Dadvar et
al. [14] use machine learning to detect YouTube users exhibit-
ing cyberbullying behavior. Whereas, rather than focusing on
single offending users, we look at videos that are likely to re-
ceive hate and raids and their attributes from various users.
Finally, Hine et al. [30], as already discussed, show that un-
derground forums such as 4chan organize raids to platforms
like Twitter, Google, and YouTube.
Overall, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
study video properties, such as their transcripts, metadata, and
thumbnails, to shed light on the characteristics of the videos
raided by the users of such platforms, using advanced machine
and deep learning techniques to perform detection of videos
targeted by raids.
8 Conclusion
This paper presented a supervised learning based approach to
automatically determine whether a YouTube video is likely to
be “raided,” i.e., receive a sudden spike in hateful comments
as a result of an orchestrated effort coordinated from another
platform. Our experimental results showed that even single-
input classifiers that use metadata, thumbnails, or audio tran-
scripts can be effective, and that an ensemble of classifiers can
reach high detection performance, thus providing a deployable
early-warning system.
Overall, our work represents an important first step toward
providing video platforms like YouTube with proactive sys-
tems geared to detect and mitigate coordinated hate attacks.
We discussed potential deployment strategies that could be
taken by YouTube (or other providers), i.e., running our tool
on every video at upload time and/or monitoring fringe com-
munities such as 4chan to screen videos that are linked to on
those platforms.
Note that the classifiers presented in this paper are not meant
to provide a mechanism for censoring content or users, nor to
identify users possibly involved in raids. Rather, we aim to
identify content that is at risk of attack; once identified, proac-
tive solutions to protect against raiders can be taken by the
service providers. While the specifics are beyond the purpose
of this paper, we believe that there are actions that can be taken
that protect freedom of expression while also preserving civil
discourse. For example, temporarily disabling or rate limiting
comments, requiring new comments to be approved before go-
ing live, or simply notifying the poster that a raid might be
coming could serve to balance protection vs. expression.
As part of future work, we plan to use deep-learning meth-
ods to fuse audio, video, and metadata into a single classifier.
We also plan to look into raids from other communities, such
as Reddit, Gab.ai, and Kiwi Farms.
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